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In keeping with trends in the academy and the rapidly increasing presence, 
power, and persuasion of digital and electronic media on the African continent 
and in the global economy, the study of religion and the media in South Africa 
has become a flourishing field of intellectual inquiry. The expanse of the field 
in terms of approaches, both methodological and theoretical, demonstrates the 
multiple and complex interactions between religion and the media in a diverse 
range of societies and settings. In light of its recent history of apartheid and 
transition into democracy in the middle 1990s, when paradigmatic 
constitutional and political changes took place in which the relationship 
between religion and the media was reconstituted, the South African context, 
in particular, is ripe for exploring media technology and practices in relation to 
the political economy of the sacred. This essay pays tribute to David Chidester 
by testing the possibilities of his theory of ‘wild religion’ against two vignettes 
of wild media in South Africa. The first, characterized as TV is the devil 
explores the apartheid government’s pre-emptive religiously saturated ban on 
television. The second example, described as the devil is on TV assesses 
viewers’ responses to the television program, Lucifer. I argue that when read 
with Chidester’s theorization of the ‘wild ambivalence of the sacred’, these 
examples evoke the hitherto under-explored wild character of both religion and 
the media. 
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In 2008 I had just graduated with an undergraduate degree majoring in 
Religious Studies and Media from the University of Cape Town. With very 
little experience but riding the coat tails of the ivy league(ish) credentials that 
an education from the University of Cape Town provides, I was employed as 
a research coordinator by a television production company. My job was to 
provide research support for a children’s television program about religion in 
South Africa. The material I gathered would be used by scriptwriters to create 
dialogue for the program’s main characters. The stars of the show were two 
puppets, shocking pink Dudu and florescent green Musa. Every Saturday 
morning, they fulfilled the national broadcaster’s mandate to provide non-
confessional educational religious programming to South African audiences. 
Astonished at my newly minted status as a gainfully employed religious studies 
graduate, I immediately informed David Chidester, the professor I most wanted 
to impress. After listening to me relay the absurdities of television production, 
he referred to the puppets as scholars of religion, and the whole enterprise of 
public broadcasting and religion as a project of the political economy of the 
sacred. Thoroughly disturbed and intrigued by Chidester’s incisive reading of 
the new context within which I found myself, I quit my job less than a year 
later, registered for postgraduate studies, and the rest, as they say, is history. 
Chidester has designated a theory of ‘wild religion’ that has 
emancipated religion from conventional definitions that are primarily 
determined by its proximity to ‘specialised institutions dealing in 
transcendence’ to a more nuanced understanding of ‘religion as an open set of 
resources and strategies for negotiating a human identity’ (Chidester 2012:8-
9). In his estimation, the sacred is produced, not only in opposition to but also 
in relation to the wild. Both the wild and the sacred remain unstable categories 
that are defined and redefined in response to the dynamisms of human 
societies. In his book, written in 2012, he revisits and highlights an enduring 
question present throughout his work: Who owns the sacred? This question can 
be further unraveled by asking who holds the authority to determine what is 
sacred and what is not, under what conditions this authority is dispensed, and 
what this all could mean for the ways in which religion is defined and for the 
ways in which the presence of religion is negotiated in religiously diverse 
societies.  





An exceptionally large and varied corpus of work on the topic of 
religion and the media has emerged from scholars working within often 
complementary and sometimes competing disciplines, including media 
studies, religious studies, cultural anthropology, psychology, political studies, 
and sociology. The depth and breadth of the literature and research undertaken 
in relation to religion and the media as an area of sustained scholarly concern 
and attention, are evidence to the prevalence of these concepts and their 
complex relationships to each other and to other crucial aspects of human 
experience. Hackett proposes that adopting the media as a central category of 
analysis in studies of religion can provide fresh perspectives on many of the 
core concepts in the social sciences (viz. power, agency, practice, 
representation, embodiment, identity, citizenship, authority, community, 
diaspora, transformation, and the making of [religious] subjects/publics/ 
counter-publics) (Hackett 2014:67).  
The adoption of the media as a category of analysis, particularly in a 
study of religion within the context of a new and emerging nation, provides 
one with the opportunity to evaluate the history of religion in South Africa 
through exploring the ways in which religion and the media as categories have 
been configured within changing socio-political contexts.  
Chidester’s penchant for the popular is a hallmark of his scholarship. 
In his 1996 essay, The church of baseball, the fetish of Coca-Cola, and the 
potlatch of Rock ‘n’ Roll’, Chidester borrows from a baseball player, an 
eclectic author who has written books on Coca-Cola and coffee, and a rock 
critic’s interpretation of the 1963 song Louie, Louie, to establish the concepts 
‘church’, ‘fetish’, and ‘potlatch’ as theoretical models for the study of religion 
in American popular culture. While wielding the authority of the popular in an 
extended exploration of baseball, Coca-Cola, and Rock ‘n’ Roll, Chidester 
submits these concepts to theoretically rigorous critique. He does this in order 
to show their potential and utility for ‘our understanding of the character of 
religion, and the ways in which the very term “religion”, including its 
definition, application, and extension, does not in fact belong solely to the 
academy but is constantly at stake in the exchanges of cultural discourses and 
practices’ (Chidester 1996:745). Furthermore, the article, later expanded in the 
book, Authentic fakes (Chidester 2005), suggests that popular culture is a valid 
epistemological site for observing and engaging the ongoing issue of defining 
religion and its complexity in an increasingly mediatized world. Chidester’s 





penchant for the popular, albeit entertaining and memorable, is neither 
arbitrary nor vacuous.  
In acknowledgement of Chidester’s invitation to track the sacred 
through unconventional strategies and resources, following this broad and 
productive approach to both, the definition of religion, and the location of 
knowledge about religion, this essay attempts to do three things: It explores 
‘the wild ambivalence of the sacred’, the appearance of the sacred as 
‘fundamentalisms’, as well as its dual dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, 
and ‘exorcism and domestication’, especially as it relates to the relationship 
between religion and television during apartheid and democracy (Chidester 
2012:8-9). In light of Chidester’s question and provocation, ‘Who owns the 
sacred?’, this essay is particularly interested in reflecting on some of the 
consequences of the media’s stake in the ownership of the sacred. In order to 
pursue this line of analysis, this essay conceptualizes the media’s participation 
in the political economy of the sacred in two ways. 
 
 
The media and the political economy of the sacred 
The media can be understood to be in conceptual and material opposition to 
religion. However, the antagonism that this formulation of religion and the 
media is predicated upon, is not considered static. It is subject to technological, 
substantive, and contextual shifts that may work to reinforce or contest this 
arrangement. Furthermore, foregrounding the conflict that plays a role in 
defining the relationships between religion and the media does not dismiss the 
position that religion and the media do not necessarily occupy separate 
theoretical and operational domains, but that they can be viewed as 
conceptually and organizationally similar and mutually constitutive (Morgan 
2011; Stolow 2013). A scholar on religion, media, and technology, Jeremy 
Stolow, has thoroughly scrutinized the relationship between religion and 
technology by revising ‘the very supposition that religion and technology exist 
as two ontologically distinct arenas of experience, knowledge, and action’ 
(Stolow 2013:2). As with wild religion, the dialectical dualism that emerges 
when considering the historical and operational tension between religion and 
the media is not in need of resolution. Instead, it may be viewed as a productive 
point of departure for considering the multiple ways in which the political 
economy of the sacred has been implicated in the political economy of the 
media.  





Second, the media acts as sites for the production and circulation of 
images and discourses that contain representations of religious traditions and 
religious diversity. This conception of the media is supported by a body of 
scholarship on ‘the media politics of religious diversity’ (Eisenlohr 2012:37) 
and encompasses issues related to the representation of images and discourses 
of religious tradition and religious diversity. However, it also speaks to the 
ways in which the ‘media and media practices are a generative force in 
producing diversity and its particular shapes’ (Eisenlohr 2012:37). Mirroring 
‘wild religion’, wild media operates outside of the control of traditional 
religious settings and outside of the auspices of traditional figures of authority.  
Wild religion in its interaction with wild media is subject to processes 
of mediatization that are crucial to the operational and ideological character of 
media technology (Hjarvard 2016). In terms of form and content, religion in 
the media is constantly defined and redefined by media-makers, users, 
audiences, and critics. In this way the media, as conduit of information about 
religion, and in compliance to its institutional norms through the particularity 
of its modalities of production and circulation, also constitutes a threat to those 
who consider its generative and interpretative functions in relation to religion 
as inappropriate (Hjarvard 2016; Meyrowitz 1993). Non-religious media 
sources and sites are able to portray religion in ways that might challenge 
traditional or acceptable religious and theological sensibilities in ways that are 
not necessarily approved of by religious authorities and constituencies. Since 
the political economy of the media necessarily works to mold religion to meet 
its institutional modus operandi, wild media presents interpretations of religion 
that are unpredictable and unauthorized.  
 
 
Television as the devil  
The National Party government considered television a credible threat to the 
social order of apartheid. The government’s position was underwritten by wild 
religiopolitical moral discourses and sentiments. Before its introduction, the 
National Party worked hard to justify the absence of television. The 
government pleaded poverty – that the state could simply not afford the fiscal 
strain on the state coffers that would be incurred by introducing a television 
service. They argued that the country had more pressing matters needing 
attention and that it would take a lot of work to materially implement separate 
development for a technology they considered frivolous at the time. However, 





religion, particularly Christianity as interpreted through the lens of Afrikaner 
nationalism and the Dutch Reformed Church, played a prominent role in 
bolstering the National Party’s anti-television stance to both the members of 
parliament and the public. 
The deeply religious, Christian nationalist approach that the National 
Party government sought to permeate every facet of life, was crucial to the 
banning and unbanning of television. Bernard Cros (1996) observes, from the 
House of Assembly debates from the 1950s to the late 1960s, that television 
was considered an idol – a god located within the household, with the ability 
to hypnotize the viewer – thus transgressing the first of the Ten Commandants. 
Alluding to both the financial and apparently moral cost of a television, a 
member of the National Party declared in parliament: ‘We dare not sell our 
national soul and that at the high cost of introduction and maintenance of 
television’ (Hansaard 1963:6517). At a time when television was a 
commonplace commodity in most parts of the world, South African politicians 
were in the throes of debating whether, in addition to radio, television was in 
fact necessary (Nixon 1994; Bevan 2008; Krabill 2010).  
Television was perilous to the National Party’s vision of Afrikaner 
hegemony. Unlike English programming, which was readily available for 
purchase, screening, and viewing, programming in Afrikaans was non-existent 
and would need to be developed from scratch. Its introduction threatened to 
undermine the hard-won gains made to elevate the status of the Afrikaner 
language and culture. Television threatened the very basis of the apartheid 
ideology and policy, and divinely inspired separate development. The 
government blamed racial mixing in other contexts on the availability of 
television and sought to protect South Africa from a similar fate. According to 
Orlick (1970:2), 
 
[a]n official of the Broederbond (a supra-political secret society 
devoted to the promotion of Afrikaner values) pointed out that 
although the struggle against Anglicisation from without had been 
won, the struggle against the enemy from within had just started and 
must succeed in stopping non-Afrikaner influences based on English 
and American ways of life which were infiltrating the Union through 
the radio, cinema, and popular press. 
 





Therefore, it was prudent for the National Party government to temporarily 
dismiss the propaganda potential of television and delay the establishment of a 
television service during the early years of its power. As a result, South Africa 
would become one of the last countries in the world to introduce a television 
service.  
The moon landing of 1969 represented the proverbial last straw for 
many white South Africans, with one journalist, echoing the public sentiment, 
observing that ‘the situation is becoming a source of embarrassment for the 
country’ (Cape Times 1969). The National Party, however, remained steadfast 
in its anti-television position. Although, as popular demand for television 
increased by the 1960s, in the face of a mounting political opposition and the 
threat of new technology such as satellites, television’s introduction became 
inevitable.  
The parliamentary opposition to the National Party, the United Party 
(UP), determined that its constituency’s desire to be associated with this 
modern technology was so strong that, as a part of its election campaigns, the 
UP promised the introduction of a television service. In response, the National 
Party fortified its opposition, stating that ‘inside the pill (of television) there is 
the bitter poison which will ultimately mean the downfall of civilizations’ 
(Hansaard 1966:5287). The Minister of Post and Telegraphs, Albert Herzog, 
had declared television, the ‘devil’s own box for disseminating communism 
and immorality’ (Hansaard 1959:5020). In 1960, Prime Minister Hendrik 
Verwoerd, in his inaugural address, declared television a ‘spiritual danger’ and 
compared it to the physical threat of an atom bomb (Hansaard 1960:3002). The 
head of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), Piet Meyer, in 
contradistinction to television, spoke of radio with the highest esteem, claiming 
that ‘radio distinguishes itself [from television] by the fact that it does not 
enslave and does not want to enslave the human spirit’ (SABC Annual Report 
1968:7). Together, Albert Herzog, Hendrik Verwoerd, and Piet Meyer were 
the anti-television triumvirate (Nixon 1994). 
Although perceived as a spiritual danger that sought to undermine the 
Christian national character of the nation that the apartheid state had labored 
to construct and maintain, television sets themselves were not banned. 
According to Herzog, ‘There is nothing to prohibit the television as long as the 
set is not used’ (Hansaard 1963:2312). The National Party government was not 
opposed to the little black box as a material object but worried about what the 
activation of this device through a television service would mean for the culture 





of apartheid. However, when the development of satellite technology meant 
that the potential for the transmission and reception of unauthorized viewing 
was becoming a real threat, the apartheid government coordinated television’s 
transformation from sinful to righteous. With the advent of satellite 
technology, for those who could not wait on the state to make a decision one 
way or the other, an aluminum kitchen mixing bowl served as a makeshift 
satellite dish which could, if weather conditions were favorable, intercept 
international programs, bringing snowy images and crackling sounds into the 
home.  
Television’s transformation from foe to friend was swift. Within two 
years of the moon landing, the Commission of Inquiry into Matters relating to 
Television would propose the introduction of a television service. Headed by 
Piet Meyer, the Commission was widely considered the government’s 
mouthpiece. After the Commission presented its findings, the apartheid 
government declared that a television service that gave ‘direct and unequivocal 
expression to the established Christian, Western set of norms and values that 
are valid for South African society in all spheres of life’ – which would also 
‘strengthen and enrich [the] religious and spiritual life’ of the nation – would 
be introduced (Meyer 1971:16). After decades of being at the center of 
controversy, television was redeemed of its subversive intentions and absolved 
of its treasonous potential. 
The SABC was earmarked as a crucial means for solidifying apartheid 
and churning out propaganda that would ensure that all South Africans, 
regardless of race, class, or gender would be subjected to broadcast material 
that was authorized by the National Party. With the rise of the National Party, 
the SABC became a government institution, managed by Afrikaner nationalists 
who interpreted broadcasting policy and instituted broadcasting practice 
through the lens of apartheid (Meyer 1971). However, the SABC was still 
bound, at least in principle, to public broadcasting ideals, inspired by John 
Reith, Director-General of the British Broadcasting Corporation, which 
dictated that the principles of objectivity and impartiality could only be 
suspended during times of crisis or war. In 1961, after the Sharpeville 
Massacre, the head of the SABC shifted the meaning of the term ‘crisis’ in the 
broadcasting code to mean hostility toward the republic, essentially providing 
the SABC with the right to only broadcast material which positively 
represented the National Party (Hayman & Tomaselli 1989). The SABC annual 
report of 1961 justifies this practice: 





Political reports are regarded as contentious and are only broadcast 
when they are of a factual and/or authoritative nature, or if they consist 
of a positive policy or statement by a political party represented in 
Parliament and do not contain comparisons with, or comments on, the 
declared policy or conduct of other South African political parties 
(SABC Annual Report 1961:8). 
 
Television broadcasting would be subjected to the same censorship measures 
as radio. The result was that the ‘SABC became the ideological repository of 
and chief apologist for Apartheid, offering a broadcasting policy characterized 
by an unabashedly pro-government stance and programming for the white 
majority’ (Mzamane 2006:2).  
In analyzing the apartheid government’s pre-emptive ban on 
television, Nixon proposes that censorship and nationalism overlapped in a 
range of ways that shed light on the various manifestations of political projects 
and state authority. Following what can be considered a theory of social-
identity formation, Nixon argues that nationalism constructed and articulated 
group identity primarily around criteria of exclusion. The nexus of nationalism 
was based on sameness and difference. By the same token, according to Nixon 
(1994:61), censorship set the specific conditions, under which the permissible 
was separated from that which was deemed impermissible. In South Africa, 
Afrikaner nationalism as a political ideology had a complicated liaison with a 
particular Christian national ethic that was informed and legitimized by the 
Dutch Reformed Church. The National Party government’s suspicion of the 
new mass medium of television was defined by a basic binary separation of the 
sacred from the profane, assuming that religion and media technology operated 
in conflicting domains and were subsequently incompatible. 
The religiopolitical character of the National Party located the sacred 
and perceived threats to it in multiple places. The lines between the state and 
church were blurred and interchangeable. While it is not within the scope of 
this paper to explicate the deeply rooted theological underpinnings of apartheid 
in general, it is evident that religion was used by the National Party to make 
sense of the absence and subsequent introduction of television to South Africa. 
In relation to the television question, the wild ambivalence of the sacred can 
be identified in the wilderness of apartheid religion which saw itself as the 
bastion of both social order and social ordering through the separate 
development of races.  





The early history of television in South Africa illustrates how the 
National Party’s attitude towards television was characterized by a suspicion 
of the technology as cosmologically incompatible with the religiously 
legitimated political and social order of apartheid. For the apartheid 
government, the relationship between religion and technology was determined 
by the view ‘that religion and technology can be parcelled out as two discrete 
dimensions of the cosmos’ (Stolow 2012:4). In the case of the apartheid 
government’s pre-emptive ban on television, technology was regarded as more 
than just technical devices that made communication possible. The essential 
nature of television technology was considered harmful to the existing social 
order. The wildness of the media is patent in this example. Between the sacred 
national values of racial separatism and the profane possibilities of 
Anglicization and miscegenation that television brought, it was media’s 
potentially destructive attitude towards established values and norms that was 
emphasized (Orlick 1970). Television was the symbol of the kind of integration 
that would usurp the Afrikaner as well as their language, religion, and culture 
of its normative omnipotence in South Africa. 
 
 
The devil on television 
In January 2016, M-Net, South Africa’s subscription-funded television 
channel, screened the Fox-produced American fantasy police procedural 
drama, Lucifer. Set in contemporary Los Angeles, Lucifer tells the story of 
satan on an extended sabbatical from his regular duties as lord of the 
underworld, experiencing life away from hell. Lucifer is cast as a generically 
attractive, fashionable, wealthy, thirty-something white male with a British 
accent, that is apparently an aphrodisiac for every mortal woman he 
encounters, save for a beautiful but tough and jaded police officer and divorced 
single mother, Chloe Decker. To give the show a predictably ‘unpredictable’ 
twist, Lucifer, in response to the murder of a lover, inserts himself as an 
unwelcome but useful consultant to the Los Angeles Police Department. In the 
United States, reviews for the show were mixed. According to one reviewer, 
‘[t]he devil is hot…[but] his cases not so hot’ (Slezak 2016). Another reviewer 
commented: ‘Lucifer starts hot, cools quickly’ (Slezak 2016; Bianco 2016).  
One critic summed up what appears to be the overall consensus: 
‘Lucifer is as fun and flashy as its promotions have promised. Just don’t go 
into this one expecting anything more extraordinary’ (Rawden 2016). Lucifer 





is cast as a typically defiant anti-hero following in the footsteps of the many 
others in Batman, Daredevil, and Deadpool. Reviewer Chris Cabin (2016) of 
Slant Magazine made the following scathing comment on the character: 
 
He never does anything that truly suggests a moral complexity beyond 
an interest in threesomes, jazz piano, and good scotch. The character 
isn’t so much evil, or even a particularly bad person, as he’s a showy, 
attention-hungry douche, the sort of guy who thinks every woman 
alone at the bar is secretly waiting for him to talk to her. 
 
Reviews aside, the American Family Association in the United States so 
thoroughly disapproved of the show that it managed to secure a petition of over 
140,000 signatories demanding that Lucifer be cancelled, threatening its 
corporate sponsors with boycotts.  
In South Africa, Lucifer was warmly received, but not in a hospitable 
way. After the screening of the first episode, the dominant headline on news 
and review sites described the reaction of Christian viewers to the show: 
‘Lucifer gets viewers fired up’ (Ferreira 2016a). An Afrikaans newspaper 
reported, ‘Hel los ná “Lucifer” se eerste episode’ (Hell breaks loose after 
Lucifer’s first episode) (Pekeur 2016). Errol Naidoo, a popular evangelical 
minister and self-proclaimed leader of the ‘Christian voice in government and 
the media’, issued an urgent call to subscribers of the Christian lifestyle 
magazine, Joy. In this call to action, Naidoo implored Christians to stand up 
for righteousness and to take action against the show by complaining to the 
Broadcasting Complaints Commission of South Africa (BCCSA) and the Chief 
Executive Officer of the broadcasting network. Naidoo declared, ‘The program 
is obviously targeted at youth – hence the early broadcast schedule. When the 
personification of all that is evil is given a positive spin by Hollywood – then 
you and I must not only pray – but act decisively!’ (Naidoo 2016). Whether of 
their own accord or incited by Naidoo, Christian viewers asserted their right to 
freedom of religion and to the pursuit of administrative justice by lodging 
almost one hundred separate complaints – the most ever received by the 
BCCSA for any broadcast. Below is a selection of the complaints: 
 
It is completely unacceptable to me that an offensive series like Lucifer 
be televised…I would suggest that DStv contribute to the cultivation 
of this country and community and not break it down and let it fall into 





sin – from pornography to Satan worship. It is unacceptable to say the 
least. 
We find the new series Lucifer distasteful. It’s being aired in a 
prime slot in the evening and we feel it promotes Satan as something 
intriguing which we find offensive. If it must be aired then it should 
be aired in a late off-peak slot or on the DStv Explora. 
DStv is broadcasting this series on Wednesday evening, that 
actively portrays Satan/Lucifer as a hero to innocent people who might 
not know better. Has he succeeded in deceiving DStv and South 
African Christians, to believe that this is an innocent fable as well? In 
the meantime I cannot support DStv while they are actively spreading 
Satan’s word.  
I find it most disturbing that this kind of series is aired during 
family time (19:00). It goes against any grain of Christianity to project 
Satan as a caring and helpful ‘person’. Children especially will be 
giving contradicting messages when allowed to watch this. I know one 
can block it or remove the channel but that is not the point, what has 
become of morality and values? (Ferreira 2016a). 
 
The registrar of the BCCSA declared the series a bona fide drama and did not 
prescribe any sanctions for the broadcaster. One BCCSA official reported 
receiving hate mail after the decision was made public (Abraham 2016). 
Although the program was not revoked by the broadcasting authority, a barrage 
of complaints from Christian viewers who threatened to cancel their 
subscriptions to the channel ensued shortly after the first episode. A new 
headline emerged: ‘M-Net shifts satan to TV hell after Lucifer complaints’ 
(Ferreira 2016b). Within a matter of days, Lucifer was moved from a primetime 
19:00 time slot with an age restriction of 13 years, to 23:00 on the least watched 
day and time slot with an age restriction of 18, accompanied by no less than 
three pre-broadcasting warnings. Despite this action on the part of the 
broadcasters, some Christian viewers were still unsatisfied. A collective of 
evangelical Christian leaders thanked the broadcaster for the time slot change 
and the age restriction intervention but felt that this action was not enough to 
mitigate the potential harm that the program could cause the impressionable 
youth. This is an extract of their arguments: 
 





The Lucifer series, whether intentional or not, portrays Satan – the 
personification of all that is evil – in a sympathetic manner. This is 
highly dangerous especially to impressionable youth in our 
nation…The program portrays Satan as a cool and misunderstood 
individual. Again, whether intentional or not, the impression one gets 
after viewing the program is that Satan, whom the Bible calls the 
‘father of lies’ is not such a bad guy after all. Lucifer, then, is given a 
Hollywood makeover and becomes more appealing…We further 
believe the trendy portrayal of the devil in the ‘Lucifer’ series will 
mainstream evil behaviour. The popular media has historically been 
used to either humanise or dehumanise people to great effect. The 
‘Lucifer’ series humanises the personification of evil to the extent that 
evil becomes trendy…Evil, or the personification thereof must be 
strongly condemned and discouraged not positively and 
sympathetically portrayed in the popular media. We trust that M-Net 
will put people before profit and will act swiftly to protect our youth 
from negative and damaging influences on national television in South 
Africa (Admin 2016). 
 
A number of inferences about the history, politics, and regulation of religion 
on television in South Africa can be made in response to the complaints, 
reviews, and replies from the broadcaster regarding the fallout with Lucifer. 
First, considering the loss of revenue that would be experienced by moving the 
show to a less lucrative time slot, it could be argued that M-Net’s advertising 
revenue would have less of a fiscal impact than the potential loss of revenue 
from the cancelled subscriptions of upset Christian viewers. This would not be 
the first time that a South African corporation has capitulated to the demands 
of Christian consumers. In 2010, under pressure from Christian groups, retailer 
Woolworths reversed a decision to remove Christian magazines from the shelf 
in a matter of days. Commercial power, therefore, is an important factor in 
religion and public broadcasting.  
Second, as evidenced in the complaints, are insights into how South 
Africans consider the role of television at a national level, as a place for the 
dissemination of values and morals, and not merely entertainment, echoing a 
demand for Reithian (cf. John Reith above) ideals, even on subscription 
television. The opinions of viewers draw attention to the perceived influence 
of television in South Africa, as the complaints indicate – not only outrage that 





the religiously offensive material was broadcast, but also concern about the 
perceived purpose and the potential outcomes that screening Lucifer could 
have on the youth of the country. The complaints underscore the willingness 
on the part of concerned Christians to engage the media institutions in order to 
have their religious sensibilities protected and their religious interests 
advanced. While this example shows that religion is clearly entangled in its 
authority to regulate broadcasting, it also shows how the media programming 
has the ability to interpret familiar scripts according to different standards. In 
the case of Lucifer, religion is mediated through the entertainment agenda of 
the media. Given the current popular affection for the anti-hero through this 
interpretation, the ultimate ‘bad guy’ of evangelical Christianity is represented 
as not so bad.  
 
 
Wild religion and wild media 
The reflection of Chidester (2012:88) on fundamentalism as the ‘wildest of 
wild religion’ is particularly helpful for making sense on the relationship 
between and attitudes towards religion and the media, as it has unfurled within 
the context of the television question in apartheid South Africa and more 
recently, in the post-apartheid era. The concept of ‘fundamentalisms’ as 
suggested by Chidester, is a ‘recurring but shifting sign of a crisis of religious 
authenticity’. He affirms that religiously inspired responses to perceived 
affronts about the established social order, although a constant feature of the 
historical landscape, are always ‘situational and relational’ (Chidester 
2012:87-89). The enduring question of ‘who owns the sacred’ is once again 
posed, toyed with, and rigorously assessed. As both examples of wild media 
show, the political economy of the sacred in the media is not only determined 
by the dynamics of production and circulations which enable the dissemination 
of images, sounds, and discourses that represent interpretations of religious 
traditions, religious information, and religious diversity, it is also shaped by 
the ways that the processes and products produced by the media are engaged 
and negotiated by the multiple audiences and stakeholders. 
As Chidester warns, the situational and relational character of 
fundamentalism emphasizes the significance of perspective. The National 
Party government clearly did not consider or care about the effects of its 
exclusionary religiopolitical policies on all members of the population. 
Exclusion, through discourses, political policy, and practices, was a feature that 





was necessary to secure the sacred Afrikaner destiny. In general, the 
religiopolitical policies of apartheid were excellent for the beneficiaries of the 
system and incomprehensibly bad for those whom the system sought to 
conquer. For some, apartheid was a sacred social order which conquered the 
threat of Afrikaner subservience and racial equality, while for others it was a 
vast wilderness of suppression and oppression. The Christian controversy over 
Lucifer belies a disregard for freedom of expression as a necessary hallmark of 
democratic societies and implies a demand for the privileging of Christian 
sensibilities and sensitivities on the basis of numerical strength, moral 
superiority, and perhaps even economic power. Like the apartheid government 
did when they excluded and then strategically introduced television, the desire 
of these viewers turned critics to exorcise television, quite literally, of the devil, 





Finally, who owns the sacred? Between puppets, broadcasters, media-makers, 
policy-makers, politicians, viewers, critics, religious leaders, scholars of 
religion, scholars of the media, and everyone else, perhaps all of them do – and 
if they do, then things are bound to get messy. I would, however, venture to 
argue that, according to Chidester, this might be the point: Wild religion 
provides us with strategies and resources for understanding the generative 
chaos that this reality creates. The potential of ‘wild religion’ for thinking about 
the political economy of the sacred in the media and for theorizing and 
evaluating the fluctuations of wild media in contexts of religious diversity and 
socio-political dynamism lies in its characteristic ambivalence. The strength of 
Chidester’s framing of ‘wild’ goes beyond its inherent analytical value for 
considering the definition and position of religion in modern societies. It 
inspires us, as scholars of religion, to think more expansively and creatively 
about the field of research as well as the sites thereof. However, in this strength 
also lies its weakness. Chidester’s characteristic narrative style, on the one 
hand, leaves one intrigued, provoked, and theoretically challenged, yet on the 
other, leaves one wanting, at least in the methodological sense. How do we 
study wild religion? If we follow Chidester, we can observe the sacred across 
time and space through film, literature, political speeches, school curricula, 





heritage sites, news reporting, ethnographic reports, and a host of other 
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